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CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
Peter E. Broadbent, Jr.*
John E. Russell**
I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia corporate and business law changes in the last year
continue to challenge the practitioner to stay abreast of such de-
velopments in order to provide accurate advice to clients. This ar-
ticle summarizes the developments in the law in Virginia occur-
ring from June 1999 through May 2000, with the legislative
changes described based on Virginia General Assembly action in
the 2000 session. Part II examines those legislative changes in
corporate and business law (excluding public service corpora-
tion/public utility law issues). While many of the legislative
changes are not significant, three new uniform laws (revised Arti-
cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), dealing with se-
cured transactions, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, and
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act) are likely
to have a major impact on significant areas of business law prac-
tice and business conduct. Part III reviews judicial decisions on
commercial law and business entity issues during the year, in-
cluding a controversial decision on the duty of directors.
II. LEGISLATW.E DEVELOPMENTS
The 2000 General Assembly enacted three major pieces of leg-
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islation with an impact on business law: (1) the Uniform Elec-
tronic Transactions Act ("UETA");' (2) the Uniform Computer In-
formation Transactions Act ("UCITA); 2 and (3) a revised Article
9.3 The General Assembly also made minor revisions to numerous
other statutes. The new legislation can be loosely characterized as
dealing with corporate and business governance, commercial law
issues, and electronic commerce. While a number of changes were
made to statutes governing public service corporations and public
utilities, they are not included within this review.
A. Corporate and Business Governance
1. Limited Liability Company Clarifications
The 2000 General Assembly adopted legislation containing a
number of minor clarifying changes to the Virginia Limited Li-
ability Company Act.4 These changes provide that: (1) the domes-
tication in Virginia of a business entity as a limited liability com-
pany ("LLC") organized outside the United States does not
require dissolution of the foreign entity in its jurisdiction of crea-
tion;5 (2) a person may be admitted to membership in an LLC
without making a contribution to the LLC or acquiring an (exist-
ing) membership interest in the LLC;6 (3) the status of an LLC
and a former member's membership interest are preserved once a
member dissociates;7 (4) an LLC's articles of organization may re-
quire the last remaining member of an LLC to continue the LLC
by admission of a personal representative or a designee;' and (5)
an LLC has a six-month window after the last member's dissocia-
tion in which to admit a new member.9
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-479 to -497 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
2. Id. §§ 59.1-501.0 to -509.2 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
3. Id. §§ 8.9A-101 to -709 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
4. Id. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
5. Id. § 13.1-1010.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
6. Id. § 13.1-1038.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
7. Id. § 13.1-1040.2 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
8. Id. § 13.1-1046 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
9. Id.
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2. Limited Partnership Clarifications
The LLC legislation noted above also added a provision to the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act to codify existing law
that, except as otherwise provided in writing in the partnership
agreement, no partner (general or limited) has a right to receive a
distribution on account of the partner's withdrawal or any other
event that ceases to make him a partner.'0
3. Registered Limited Liability Partnerships
Another piece of 2000 General Assembly legislation made tech-
nical corrections to Virginia Code provisions on registered limited
liability partnerships ("RLLPs") involving the timing of the an-
nual reports and payment of fees. In particular, the first annual
continuation report (and fees) for an RLLP are due by July 1 of
the year after the year in which the RLLP is first registered."
In addition, the General Assembly separately authorized law
firms organized as RLLPs to serve as the registered agent of a
corporation,12 LLC,' 3 limited partnership,14 or RLLP. 5 Previously,
only individual attorneys and law firms organized as professional
corporations or professional LLCs could serve as registered
agents. 6
4. Registered Agents
In addition to the expansion of authority of law firms organized
as registered limited liability partnerships noted above, the Gen-
eral Assembly also expanded the permissible categories of non-
lawyer registered agent eligibility to add, for LLCs, a trustee of a
trust that is the member of the LLC;'7 for RLLPs, a trustee of a
10. Id. § 50-73.39:1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
11. Id. § 50-73.134 (Cuma. Supp. 2000).
12. Id. § 13.1-833 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
13. Id. § 13.1-1015 (Cumi. Supp. 2000).
14. Id. § 50-73.4 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
15. Id. § 50-73.132 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
16. Id. § 50-73.4 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
17. Id. § 13.1-1015 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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trust that is a general partner of the RLLP; 8 and for limited
partnerships, an individual who is a trustee of a trust that is a
general partner of the limited partnership.' 9
The consequences of failing to appoint a new registered agent
promptly, once a former registered agent has resigned, have been
toughened for corporations, LLCs, and limited partnerships. Pre-
viously, if an entity failed to timely appoint a new registered
agent, a rule to show cause had to be issued by the State Corpora-
tion Commission ("SCC"), followed by an opportunity for a hear-
ing.2" Under the new legislation (effective for entities whose
agents file a certificate of resignation on or after January 1,
2000), if an entity fails to appoint a new registered agent within
thirty-one days after a statement of resignation is filed, the SCC
mails a notice of impending termination of corporate existence or
cancellation (for domestic entities) or revocation of certificate of
authority (for foreign entities).2' If the entity fails to file a state-
ment of change of registered agent with the SCC within two
months after the month in which the notice is mailed, then the
SCC's regulatory sanction occurs automatically.22
5. Professional Corporations and Professional LLCs
Certified interior designers were added to the list of profes-
sionals entitled to form professional corporations and professional
LLCs Such entities must register with the Board for Architects,
Professional Engineers, Land Surveyors, Certified Interior De-
signers, and Landscape Architects.2 4 The new legislation also
provides that at least two-thirds of the entity's ownership interest
must be owned by individuals who hold a license in the service (or
one of the combined services).25
Another bill adopted provides that the articles of incorporation
of a professional corporation and the articles of organization of a
18. See id. § 50-73.135 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
19. See id. § 50-73.4 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
20. See id.
21. Id. §§ 13.1-930, 50-73.69 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 13.1-544 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
24. Id. § 13.1-549 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
25. Id.
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professional LLC must set forth a sole and specific purpose which
is permitted by the professional services statutes.26 The same
legislation also clarifies that the provisions of the Virginia Non-
stock Corporation Act shall apply to a nonstock professional cor-
poration, except to the extent that it would conflict.27 This mirrors
existing law in the relationship between stock professional corpo-
rations and the Virginia Stock Corporation Act.28
Finally, perhaps reflecting the growing expansion of accounting
firms into a wide variety of business services and the need to pro-
vide ownership incentives to non-accountants, the General As-
sembly allowed accounting firms that are professional corpora-
tions or professional LLCs to issue up to forty-nine percent of
their stock or membership interests to employees who are not
authorized to provide accounting services.29
6. Articles of Merger
The 2000 General Assembly cured a previous error in two Vir-
ginia statutes dealing with the merger process for corporations.
The statutes incorrectly referred to a plan of merger being
adopted by shareholders as an "amendment" adopted by share-
holders.30
7. SCC Document Changes and Enforcement Powers
Two pieces of new legislation deal with the role of the SCC in
relation to business entities. One piece of legislation consists of a
series of technical or housekeeping changes that (1) provide that
SCC mailings to LLCs, limited partnerships, and RLLPs have the
same presumption of delivery as SCC mailings to corporations;31
(2) provide that LLC documents filed at the SCC may be signed
by not only a member or manager, but by any other person to
whom the right and power to manage the business have been
26. Id. §§ 13.1-543, -1102 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
27. Id. § 13.1-556 (Cur. Supp. 2000).
28. See id. §§ 13.1-601 to -800 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
29. See id. §§ 13.1-549.1, -1112 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
30. See id. §§ 13.1-720, -896 (Cui. Supp. 2000).
3L Id. § 12.1-43 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
2000]
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delegated;32 (3) correct two incorrect statutory cross-references in
the Virginia Uniform Partnership Act;3 and (4) permit a RLLP to
change its office of record as part of changes made to its annual
report form, rather than requiring a separate amendment to its
statement of registration. 4
The second piece of legislation significantly enhanced the dollar
amounts of fines that the SCC may impose. The penalty for fail-
ure to obey SCC rules, injunctions, or orders has increased from a
maximum fine of $1000 per day to a maximum fine of $5000 per
day for an individual or $10,000 per day for a business entity. 5
B. Commercial Law Developments
1. Secured Transactions
The 2000 General Assembly adopted a new and revised Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code which is effective July 1,
2001.6 This is a sweeping revision based on a uniform model
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws.3
While an analysis of the new Article 9 is beyond the scope of
this survey, it generally broadens the scope of the old Article 9 by
including several new kinds of property and transactions, re-
flecting changes in electronic commerce, simplifying rules for se-
curity interests, and adding consumer transaction protections."
Some examples of the changes covered in revised Article 9 in-
clude: (1) software imbedded in goods are "goods;"39 (2) both pay-
ment obligations arising from the sale, lease, or license of all
types of property and credit card receivables are "accounts;"40 (3)
creation of a "payment" intangible as a type of "general" intangi-
32. Id. § 13.1-1003 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
33. Id. § 50-73.128 (Cur. Supp. 2000).
34. Id. § 50-73.136 (Cur. Supp. 2000).
35. Id. § 12.1-33 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
36. Id. § 8.9A-101 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
37. See U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to -708 (amended 2000), 3 U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2000).
38. See id.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-102(a)(44) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
40. Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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ble;" (4) promissory notes are included within "instruments;"2
and (5) health care insurance receivables are now within its
scope.43
Security agreements will be able to be authenticated, rather
than signed.44 "Control" of investment property will qualify as a
method of perfecting a security interest in such property."5 Auto-
matic perfection will apply to sale of payment intangibles and
promissory notes.46 There will be a single filing place (the debtor's
"location," which for a business entity means its state of organiza-
tion) for all kinds of collateral.'7 An "all assets" filing in a financ-
ing statement (though not a security agreement) will be permis-
sible, and no signature of a debtor will be required to file a
financing statement.' Filings in Virginia will be with the SCC
only.49 No local filings (except fixture filings) will be required.'
Virginia business lawyers, particularly those involved in fi-
nancing transactions, will need to become familiar with the intri-
cacies of Revised Article 9. In operation, however, the new Article
9 may help resolve many uncertainties under existing law and
simplify future secured transactions.
2. Credit Unions
The 2000 General Assembly passed legislation granting credit
unions the same protection and authority with respect to fiduci-
ary share accounts and issuance of shares now possessed by other
financial institutions.5 Administrators, executors, custodians,
conservators, guardians, trustees, or other fiduciaries for a
named beneficiary may obtain such shares and maintain such ac-
counts.5 " The payment of funds to such a fiduciary relieves the
credit union from any liability for payment or delivery. 3
4. Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(42) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
42. Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(65) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
43. Id. § 8.9A-102(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
44. See id. § 8.9A-102(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
45. See id. § 8.9A-106 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
46. See id. § 8.9A-313 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
47. See id. § 8.9A-501 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
48. See id. § 8.9A-504 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
49. See id. § 8.9A-501 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
50. See id.
51. See id. § 6.1-225.50:1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
52. Id.
53. Id.
20001
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If a fiduciary or agent purchases shares in a credit union in his
own name, but with instruments indicating a fiduciary capacity,
the credit union need not inquire into whether there is any
breach of fiduciary duty. However, if the credit union has actual
knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty, or such knowledge that
issuing the shares or paying a withdrawal amounts to bad faith,
then the credit union has no protection under the statute.54
3. Debt-Counseling Agencies
Amendments to the legislation governing licensed nonprofit
debt counseling agencies now authorize such agencies to be reim-
bursed for certain out-of-pocket costs and permit a monthly fee
increase from five dollars to twenty dollars. 5 Persons outside the
Commonwealth are prohibited from offering debt-counseling
services to persons within the Commonwealth without SCC quali-
fication and license fees.56 Agencies must also separately advise
debtors in writing that the agencies' debt pooling and distribution
services may have a derogatory effect on the debtor's credit rat-
ing.5
7
4. Enterprise Zones
New legislation effectively permits the creation of additional
enterprise zones without removing the present cap of sixty areas,
with no more than three zones in any county, city, or town. 8 One
enterprise zone in any single jurisdiction could already consist of
two noncontiguous zone areas; the new legislation authorizes a
joint enterprise zone to consist of both two noncontiguous zone
areas in a single jurisdiction and one more noncontiguous zone
area in each adjoining jurisdiction that submitted the application
for the zone.59
54. See id. § 6.1-225.50:2 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
55. See id. § 6.1-363.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. § 59.1-274 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
59. See id.
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5. Securities Law and Franchising
Violations of the Virginia Securities Act and Virginia Retail
Franchising Act are presently punishable by SCC penalties im-
posed after notice and a hearing. °
The 2000 General Assembly amendment clarified that any SCC
penalties so imposed are civil penalties, rather than criminal
ones .
61
C. Electronic Commerce
1. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA") is a uni-
form law, proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, that generally seeks to avoid any invali-
dation or penalties on electronic transactions merely because they
are not in paper form.62 The 2000 General Assembly adopted this
legislation to provide rules and procedures for using electronic re-
cords and electronic signatures in commercial and governmental
transactions.63 In addition to a new stand-alone Uniform Elec-
tronic Transactions Act, numerous existing Virginia Code sec-
tions were amended or repealed to reflect the new framework.
There are certain exceptions in the legislation, and the types of
electronic signatures and authentication criteria are left to the
private parties (or the public body) to determine.' How quickly
each public body in the Commonwealth develops the necessary
security and confidentiality protections and criteria to implement
electronic transactions generally is likely to vary widely. Between
private parties, each must agree to conduct a particular transac-
tion by electronic means, and each has a nonwaivable right to re-
fuse to conduct other transactions by electronic means.
From a conceptual standpoint, one of the most interesting fea-
tures is the approval of automated transactions in which a con-
60. See id. § 13.1-521 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
61. See id. § 13.1-521 (Cure. Supp. 2000).
62. Id. § 59.1-479 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
63. See id. §§ 59.1-479 to -497 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
64. See id. § 59.1-480 (Cum. Supp. 2000). Wills, for example, and court filings are still
governed by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
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tract may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents of the
parties, even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the elec-
tronic agents' actions or the resulting terms of an agreement. 65
2. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("UCITA), 66 another uniform law proposed by the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, establishes a uniform
contracting regime for licenses of computer information, much as
UCC Article 2 does for goods. The 2000 General Assembly leg-
islation that adopted UCITA constituted the first adoption of
UCITA by any state; however, it was given a July 1, 2001 effec-
tive date to permit lingering objections to be addressed, if neces-
sary, by an intervening study and possible further legislation in
2001.68
The new UCITA legislation provides a progressive framework
for electronic commerce by ensuring the enforceability of licenses
of computer information that fall within its rules. In particular,
UCITA addresses the enforceability of "shrinkwrap" contracts (or,
more appropriately, "cickwrap" contracts) along with reasonable
restrictions on a licensor's exercise of electronic "self-help."
UCITA is necessary because Article 2 of the UCC governs only
the sale of goods. Licensing of information involves significantly
different issues. For example: the title to the licensed information
remains with the licensor and does not pass to the licensee; the
delivery form of the licensed information is irrelevant (whether
online transfer, CD-ROM or disc, etc.); there is a continuing rela-
tionship between the licensor and licensee (raising self-help is-
sues if the license is breached or not renewed by the licensee);
and the nature of computer information, typically proprietary, of-
ten confidential and easily reproducible, creates extraordinary
possibilities for injury to the licensor.
UCITA permits parties to contract freely for computer informa-
tion licenses within a commercial framework of state contract law
65. See id. § 59.1-492 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
66. Id. §§ 59.1-501.1 to -509.2 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
67. See id.
68. See id.
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that recognizes federal intellectual property law concerns. While
a detailed analysis of UCITA is beyond the scope of this article, it
is worthwhile to note a few essentials.
First, it is necessary to examine some of the definitions of
UCITA. "Computer information" is information in electronic form
that is obtained from or through the use of a computer or that is
in digital or similar form capable of being processed by a com-
puter.69 "Computer information" includes a copy of information in
that form and any associated documentation or packaging."° A
"computer information transaction" is an agreement, and the
subsequent performance of that agreement, to create, modify,
transfer, or license computer information or informational rights
in computer information.71
Second, UCITA has numerous exclusions, including: (1) finan-
cial services transactions; (2) contracts related to television or
motion picture programming or sound recordings; (3) compulsory
licenses; (4) employment contracts (except for independent con-
tractors); (5) hardware portions of software/hardware contracts,
unless the hardware is a computer or computer peripheral with
embedded software; (6) subject matter within the scope of Articles
3, 4, 4A, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the UCC; and (7) certain de minimis
transactions. 2 Where a conflict arises between UCITA and Arti-
cle 9, Article 9 governs.7
The parties to a computer information transaction can opt out
of UCITA or selectively utilize other contract provisions; but
UCITA provides default rules if the parties have not agreed oth-
erwise.
Like UETA, UCITA provides that electronic agents (or an elec-
tronic agent and an individual) may form contracts. 4 UCITA also
provides express and implied warranties similar to UCC Article 2
with respect to typical computer information issues such as in-
fringement and integration. 5
69. Id. § 59.1-501.2(a)(10) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 59.1-501.2(a)(11) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
72. Id. § 59.1-501.3(d) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
73. Id. § 59.1-501.3(c) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
74. Id. § 59.1-501.7 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
75. Id. § 59.1-504.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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"Clickwrap" contracts are approved if the licensee has had an
opportunity to see all of the terms of the contract and has "mani-
fested assent."76 If the licensee does not have the opportunity to
see all of the terms before paying, the license must provide for a
full refund, reimbursement of reasonable expenses related to its
return, and compensation for foreseeable losses caused by instal-
lation and removal of the information.7 Electronic "self-help" (to
which a licensee must separately manifest assent) is permitted
only after forty-five days notice, so long as no substantial injury
occurs to public health or safety or no grave harm occurs to the
public interest."
Unless the further study authorized by the General Assembly
produces changes, UCITA will become effective July 1, 2001 and
should truly position the Commonwealth as a national leader in
electronic commerce.
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. General Corporate Law
1. Closely Held Corporation-Sale--Directors' Duty
In Willard v. Moneta Building Supply, Inc.," the minority
shareholder of a closely held corporation operating a building-
supply business sued the majority shareholders/directors, a hus-
band and wife, to overturn the sale of the corporation to the ma-
jority shareholders/directors' son. ° The son, a former shareholder
of the corporation, had started a competing business.8'
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the
Bedford County Circuit Court, upholding the transaction in which
the majority shareholders accepted a purchase offer from their
son's company over a higher offer from the minority share-
holder.8 2 The court reached this conclusion even though the mi-
76. Id. § 59.1-502.9 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 59.1-508.16 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
79. 258 Va. 140, 515 S.E.2d 277 (1999).
80. Id. at 143-48, 515 S.E.2d at 280-83.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 143, 515 S.E.2d at 280.
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nority shareholder claimed that the majority shareholders failed
to maximize the sales price, authorized a transaction tainted by
conflict of interests, and failed to follow statutory procedures for
selling the company's business.83
In connection with the plaintiffs allegation that the defendants
failed to maximize the sales price for the company, the minority
shareholder argued that the circuit court erred by ruling that the
two majority shareholders/directors did not have a duty to maxi-
mize the price received for the sale of the company's assets and
that they also discharged their duty in accordance with Virginia
Code section 13.1-690.84 The minority shareholder argued that
the proper standard in judging the directors' decision to sell the
company's assets to their son's company was the test articulated
by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc.85
However, the circuit court concluded that section 13.1-690 did
not require a director to maximize profits by accepting the high-
est bid when selling the assets of a corporation.86 Instead, the
court concluded that a director is required to act in accordance
with his good faith business judgment for the best interests of the
corporation."7 Under the foregoing standard, the circuit court
found that a director might consider both the quantity and the
quality of an offer to purchase corporate assets.88
In affirming the rationale offered by the circuit court, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia observed that Virginia Code section 13.1-
690(A) does not abrogate the common law duties of a director.8 9
Rather, this section establishes the standard by which a director
must discharge the requisite director duties.90 Therefore, if a di-
rector acts in accord with the applicable standard, section 13.1-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 149-50, 515 S.E.2d at 283.
85. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 'The Revlon court held that the duty of a board of direc-
tors changed from one of preserving the corporate entity 'to the maximization of the com-
pany's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit' when it becomes apparent that the sale
of the company is inevitable." Willard, 258 Va. at 150, 515 S.E.2d at 283-84 (quoting Rev-
lon, 506 A.2d at 182).
86. Willard, 258 Va. at 150, 515 S.E.2d at 284.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 150-51, 515 S.E.2d at 284.
90. Id.
2000]
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690(C) provides a "safe harbor" that shields the director from li-
ability for any action taken as a director (or for any failure to take
action)." After finding the Revlon test did not apply under Vir-
ginia law, the supreme court concluded that a director's discharge
of duties should not be measured in Virginia by "what a reason-
able person would do in similar circumstances or by the rational-
ity of the ultimate decision."92 Instead, the court held that a direc-
tor must "act in accordance with his/her good faith business
judgment of what is in the best interests of the corporation" and
in so doing, his/her actions fall within the "safe harbor" protection
under section 13.1-690(C).93
In applying the foregoing rationale, the supreme court found
that the two directors (who owned the majority share of the busi-
ness) were entitled to consider the quantity and quality of the
competing offers to purchase the business assets and that they
were not "required to accept an offer merely because it maximized
the purchase price." 4 The court also noted that a contrary deter-
mination might erode the deference afforded a director's dis-
charge of duties under section 13.1-690 because "only one offer,
among many, [would be] in the best interests of a corporation."95
The supreme court also affirmed the circuit court's finding that
the two majority shareholders engaged in an informed decision-
making process in deciding to sell the company to their son.96
Moreover, the majority shareholders were justified in their fear
that the value of the company's assets might decline significantly
if they waited while their son opened a competing business dur-
ing the thirty-day period requested by the minority shareholder
to evaluate more fully the company's financial records.97 Conse-
quently, the court held that the directors discharged their duties
in accordance with section 13.1-690, and as such, they were enti-
tled to the "safe harbor" protection afforded under that statute.98
The minority shareholder also alleged a conflict of interest and
91. Id. at 151, 515 S.E.2d at 284.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 151-52, 515 S.E.2d at 285.
95. Id. at 152, 515 S.E.2d at 285.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 153, 515 S.E.2d at 285.
98. Id.
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a breach of a director's duty of loyalty as a result of the directors'
decision to sell the business to a corporation owned by their son.99
The supreme court responded to this argument by noting that
aside from the familial relationship as son and parents, plaintiff
offered absolutely no evidence of a "direct personal interest in the
transaction."' Moreover, the evidence before the circuit court
demonstrated a contrary conclusion-that the son's "resignation
as an officer and director [of his parents' business] and his new
business plans had caused considerable discord" with his par-
ents.'0 ' Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit court's alter-
native finding that the transaction was "fair," and declined to ad-
dress whether the majority shareholders had conflicts of interest
merely because their son owned the corporation that purchased
the company's assets.102
The court noted that the record established that the sharehold-
ers were presented with two options when they met in connection
with a proposed sale.' 3 They could either accept the offer from
their son's company, or they could forego a certain opportunity to
sell the company's assets and wait for an uncertain outcome of an
asset evaluation conducted by the minority shareholder (while
their son opened a competing business).' 4 Therefore, the court
concluded that the transaction was open, fair, and honest at the
time it was executed and that the plaintiff was not entitled to
void the transaction under Virginia Code section 13.1-691.I"5
Finally, in upholding the circuit court's judgment that the ma-
jority shareholders' conduct was not illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent under Virginia Code section 13.1-747, the supreme
court held that the two directors "were entitled to exercise their
rights as the majority stockholders by voting to approve the sale
of assets" to their son's company.0 6
In a terse dissenting opinion, several justices recommended the
reversal of the circuit court's judgment and a remand to deter-
99. Id. at 153, 515 S.E.2d at 286.
100. Id. at 154, 515 S.E.2d at 286 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691(C) (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 154-55, 515 S.E.2d at 286.
103. Id. at 155-56, 515 S.E.2d at 287.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 156, 515 S.E.2d at 287.
106. Id. at 157, 515 S.E.2d at 288.
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mine what damages, if any, the minority shareholder might es-
tablish at a trial specifically limited to the damages issue. 1 7 Fur-
ther, the dissent observed that the majority opinion substituted
form over substance in upholding a judgment that the minority
shareholder failed to carry his burden of proof of establishing that
the directors/majority shareholders did not discharge their duty
of loyalty in compliance with Virginia Code section 13.1-690.'08
Finally, at least one commentator in Virginia has sternly criti-
cized the outcome obtained by the majority opinion in Willard be-
cause it embodies "the profound misunderstanding of [section
13.1-1690's role in Virginia's law of director duties."'0 9
2. Fiduciary Duty--Shareholder/Director Suit
A case in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, Byelick v. Vivadelli, 0 involved a multi-count ac-
tion asserting "claims of insider trading, securities fraud under
state and federal law, common law fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and breach of an employ-
ment contract.""'
Although somewhat complex, the facts of the case involved a
suit between the two principal shareholders of a closely held cor-
poration incorporated in Virginia."' The plaintiff paid $4800 for a
107. Id. at 162, 515 S.E.2d at 291 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 159, 515 S.E.2d at 289 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
109. Lyman Johnson, Misunderstanding Director Duties: The Strange Case of Virginia,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1127, 1130 (1999). Professor Johnson, a professor of law at the
Washington & Lee University Law School, argues that in order
to honor the sound policy rationales underpinning the duty of loyalty and to
preserve integrity in Virginia corporate law, the Willard court should have
held that an asset sale to the son of the only two directors, conducted solely
by directors who were unwilling to consider a rival topping bid, to disclose it
to an absent shareholder, or to seek an expert revaluation of an earlier bid,
constitutes unfair dealing and an egregious breach of director loyalty.
Id. at 1157.
Moreover, the court should have either nullified the transaction under Virginia Code sec-
tion 13.1-692 or held the parent-directors/shareholders liable to the minority shareholder
for the approximately twenty-percent difference between a "fair price" (at a minimum, the
rival bid) and the actual sale price. See id.
110. 79 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 1999).
111. Id. at 613.
112. Id. The parties incorporated the company as a vehicle for developing and selling
computer software for "hoteling"-the practice of managing limited office space by coordi-
nating the schedules of employees and other users of space with the space available in a
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forty-percent share, and defendant paid $1800 for a sixty-percent
share of the company's stock."3 The defendant served as the com-
pany's president while the plaintiff served as secretary, treasurer,
and chief financial officer until he quit working for the com-
pany." The board of directors, consisting of the plaintiff and the
defendant, set annual salaries, but the plaintiff never received
any payments while he worked for the company." 5 After leaving
the company, the plaintiff transferred 900 shares of stock to the
defendant." 6 Each party disputed the facts surrounding the
transfer, with the plaintiff alleging that the defendant demanded
return of all stock, while the defendant contended he merely pur-
chased the plaintiffs stock."7 The board of directors (with the
plaintiff abstaining) voted to remove the plaintiff as a director
and replaced him with the defendant's wife." 8
The plaintiff and the defendant engaged in at least two dozen
telephone conversations during which, the plaintiff contended
that the defendant made five allegedly fraudulent representa-
tions that the plaintiff relied upon in selling his stock to the de-
fendant."9 The defendant's allegedly fraudulent representations
formed the basis for the plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. 20 Further, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant and his
wife failed to disclose certain financial information that they were
required to disclose.
21
particular office or building. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 614. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant made the following representa-
tions: (1) the corporation's proprietary software was not working; (2) the company's engi-
neering staff was working desperately to re-write the source code of the software to get the
product to work; (3) the company's old customers were refusing to pay the corporation's
invoices and were refusing to extend past initial, small-scale pilot programs, and they had
no new customers; (4) the company was experiencing extreme cash flow problems and a
continuing liquidity crunch; and (5) the defendant expected the company to be forced out
of business in the near future. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 614-15. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to disclose the exis-
tence of certain contracts that increased the value of the company's stock and that the
company received a written offer from a venture fund to invest $2,000,000 in exchange for
twenty-five percent ownership, based on an independent valuation of the company at
$6,000,000. Id. at 615.
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The plaintiff based his breach of fiduciary duty claim upon two
specific actions taken by the board of directors, including the
board's consent to (1) the company's waiver of its right of first re-
fusal to purchase the plaintiffs stock before the defendant or
anyone else (i.e., the board's acts causing the company to waive
the right of first refusal created a conflict of interest because it
permitted the defendant, a director, to purchase the plaintiffs
stock) and (2) the company's sale to the defendant of an addi-
tional 50,000 shares of stock (i.e., the board's acts causing the
company to sell the additional stock to the defendant in effect di-
luted the plaintiffs ownership interest in the company).'22 Ulti-
mately, the plaintiffs ownership interest in the company was re-
duced from ten percent to one percent. 1'
In connection with the plaintiffs first contention, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant."
The court held that the plaintiffs theory failed for lack of a statu-
tory predicate because the plaintiffs sale of stock was made to the
defendant in his capacity as a private individual, and not as a
sales transaction with the defendant representing the company.125
In connection with the plaintiffs second contention, the district
court observed that it was unsettled in Virginia whether a direc-
tor may be held liable to an individual shareholder for a breach of
a duty of loyalty, especially in the context of a small or closely
held corporation.2 6 If faced with the question of whether a mi-
nority shareholder of a closely held corporation maintains a cog-
nizable claim against an inside director for breach of fiduciary
duty with respect to a corporate transaction benefiting an inside
director, the district court opined that the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia would reasonably hold in the affirmative, particularly under
facts involving only one minority shareholder.'2 1
122. Id. at 622.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 623.
125. Id. Virginia Code section 13.1-691(A) defines "conflict of interests transaction" as a
"transaction with the corporation in which a director of the corporation has a direct or in-
direct personal interest." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
126. Byelick, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
127. Id. at 623-25. Interestingly, the district court clearly acknowledged that the focal
legal issue remained unsettled under Virginia law. Id. However, the trial judge opted to
make a so-called "Brie-guess" to resolve the issue, rather than seeking to certify the issue
for resolution as a matter of Virginia law by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Id. at 623.
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Furthermore, the district court concluded that a dilutive trans-
action could be challenged under the Virginia common law of fi-
duciaries .128 The court found that a shareholder could challenge
an interested director transaction in a closely held corporation
under Virginia Code section 13.1-691, but that the liability of a
director with a conflict of interest was controlled by Virginia Code
section 13.1-690.129
Thus, the plaintiff was required to proceed under section 13.1-
690 to the extent that he sought to hold the defendants liable on
the interested director transaction involving the issuance of
50,000 shares and a subsequent sale of such shares to the defen-
dant, and under section 13.1-691 to the extent he sought to void
the interested director transaction.3 0
Finally, the supreme court determined that the defendants
were required to establish that the board's consent in approving
the company's sale of additional stock to the defendant, as well as
the actual sale itself, were fair to the corporation.'3 ' The district
court concluded that the determination of fairness clearly re-
flected disputed issues of material fact, and, therefore, it denied
summary judgment and held that the plaintiff was entitled to a
trial on his claim that a breach of fiduciary duty occurred as a re-
sult of the defendant's involvement in the company's allegedly
dilutive sale of stock to the defendant.3 2
3. Nonstock Corporation-Derivative Action
In Richelieu v. Kirby,33 the Fairfax County Circuit Court held
that under the Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act, specifically
Virginia Code sections 13.1-828 and 13.1-870.1, a derivative ac-
tion may be maintained on behalf of a Virginia nonstock corpora-
tion (including a section 501(c) organization) where either allega-
tions that a corporation has acted ultra vires or allegations of
128. Id. at 627.
129. Id. at 625-28. The trial judge made this determination after considering the fidu-
ciary duties in a closely held corporation, the legislative history of the Virginia statute
bearing on interested director transactions, and dictum from the United States Supreme
Court in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). See id.
130. Id. at 628.
131. Id. at 629.
132. Id.
133. 48 Va. Cir. 260 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax County).
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willful misconduct on the part of corporate officers and directors
exist. 4
The case involved certain allegedly aggrieved members ("com-
plainants") of the Humane Society of Fairfax County, a nonstock
corporation, who sought to maintain a derivative action as plain-
tiffs on behalf of the corporation. 35 The complainants alleged that
certain named directors, officers, members, and employees ("re-
spondents") of the corporation had conspired to defraud the cor-
poration through the purchase of a farm owned by one of the re-
spondents, who was also a member and the daughter of another
respondent. 3 Further, the complainants alleged that the director
respondents engaged in a pattern of willful misconduct and
breached their fiduciary duties.
The respondents demurred on the issue of whether members of
a nonstock corporation were entitled to bring a derivative action
on behalf of the corporation. 3 ' The Humane Society demurred
and also filed a plea in bar arguing that the complainants were
not entitled to maintain a derivative action against the corpora-
tion because the complainants failed to plead that demand was
made on the corporation to institute proceedings in its own right
against the officers and directors who allegedly breached their fi-
duciary duties through mismanagement and commission of mis-
deeds. 39
First, the circuit court determined that, under the Virginia
Nonstock Corporation Act, aggrieved members of a Virginia non-
stock corporation were entitled to maintain a derivative action on
behalf of a corporation (including a section 501(c) organization) in
at least two circumstances, including (1) allegations that a corpo-
ration acted ultra vires or (2) allegations of willful misconduct on
the part of corporate officers and directors. 140
Next, the circuit court rejected the respondents' contention that
the only party with authority to act on behalf of the public in
matters involving charitable assets was the Attorney General of
134. Id. at 262.
135. Id. at 260.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 263.
140. Id. at 261-62 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-828, -870.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
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Virginia. 4 ' The court found that respondents failed to cite any
Virginia authority, statutory or otherwise, establishing a suit
brought by the Attorney General as the exclusive remedy in the
event of a breach of a fiduciary duty by a nonprofit corporation, or
by its officers or directors. 4 2 Therefore, a suit filed by the Attor-
ney General was not the exclusive means for aggrieved members
of a Virginia nonstock corporation to seek relief; rather, the
members were entitled to maintain a derivative action under Vir-
ginia law in the event of a breach of a fiduciary duty.43
Further, since the plaintiffs failed to allege either that a de-
mand was made of the respondents to bring an action on behalf of
the corporation or that, if given a demand, the corporation would
have refused to bring such a suit, the circuit court granted the
Humane Society's plea in bar and sustained the Humane Soci-
ety's demurrer."4 In support of the foregoing determinations, the
court noted that a failure to make the requisite demand (or an
allegation of demand or futility) was fatal under Virginia law in
connection with asserting derivative claims against a corporate
body.145
Finally, the circuit court also dismissed the derivative claims
asserted against each of the individual respondents because the
complainants were not entitled to assert such claims absent evi-
dence or an allegation that the complainants made the requisite
demand (or an allegation that such a demand would have been
futile). 46
4. Shareholder Derivative Action-Fraud Remedy
In Mardula v. Shamshiry, Inc.,'47 the Fairfax County Circuit
Court denied a corporation's plea in bar to a shareholder's motion
for judgment asserting personal and derivative claims.' The de-
fendant corporation filed the plea in bar questioning whether the
141. Id. at 262.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 264.
145. Id. at 263-64.
146. Id. at 264.
147. 49 Va. Cir. 55 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax County).
148. Id. at 56.
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plaintiff was a proper shareholder under either a Security and
Pledge Agreement or a Stock Transfer Agreement. The plaintiff
and the same shareholder were parties to both agreements.' 50
According to stipulated facts, the plaintiff relied on a waiver-of-
notice provision in the Security Agreement to conduct a private
sale of the corporation's stock without following the notice provi-
sions applicable under Virginia Code section 8.9-504(3).'' How-
ever, the circuit court noted the Supreme Court of Virginia's
holding in Woodward v. Resource Bank52 that the notice provi-
sions of section 8.9-504(3) may not be waived before an occurrence
of default.'53 Therefore, since the plaintiff admitted reliance upon
a waiver that was signed one and one-half years before the occur-
rence of default, the circuit court invalidated any alleged transfer
made to the plaintiff under the terms of the Security Agree-
ment.
154
In response to the plaintiffs argument that he was a share-
holder under the Transfer Agreement, the circuit court acknowl-
edged that, pursuant to the express terms of the agreement, the
shareholder transferred the stock certificates to the plaintiff at
the time of execution of the agreement. 55 The defendants re-
sponded by arguing that the shares of stock transferred to the
plaintiff were restricted from transfer.'56 The circuit court con-
cluded that, under Virginia Code section 13.1-649, a restriction on
the transfer or registration of shares of corporate stock was valid
and enforceable against the holder or transferor only if the re-
striction was conspicuously placed on either the front or back of
each stock certificate. 7 Further, the court observed that a trans-
fer restriction was specifically enforceable against a holder who
had knowledge of the restriction.5 ' Based on the foregoing, the
court held that the defendants failed to satisfy the requisite bur-
den because the shares of stock attached to the motion for judg-
149. Id. at 56-57.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 56.
152. 246 Va. 481, 436 S.E.2d 613 (1993).
153. Mardula, 49 Va. Cir. at 56.
154. Id. at 56-57.
155. Id. at 57.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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ment did not contain a conspicuously located restriction on trans-
fer.15 9
Finally, the circuit court concluded that, although the defen-
dants alleged that the plaintiff knew about the restriction on
stock transfers, the evidence in the record was insufficient to sus-
tain the defendant's plea in bar.6 ° However, the court reversed
the defendant's right to raise the issue again at trial based upon a
more fully developed record.'
5. Officer Liability-Yellow Pages Ad-Privacy Statute
In Buckman v. PTS Corp.,62 the Virginia Beach Circuit Court
overruled two defendants' demurrers to a suit complaining that
the defendants, two owners and officers of a bail bond company,
allegedly violated Virginia Code section 8.01-40 by placing an ad-
vertisement with the plaintiffs name in the Yellow Pages and by
telling or implying to prospective customers that the plaintiff con-
tinued to work for the company.'63
The defendants argued that (1) since section 8.01-40 was in
derogation of common law, it must be strictly construed, and
thus, the court must dismiss the defendants as parties if they did
not "use" the plaintiff's name in contravention of the statute, and
(2) directors are liable for their tortious conduct only if they com-
mit a common law tort because statutory torts are expressly lim-
ited by their terms."
In rejecting the defendants' first argument, the circuit court de-
termined that the Supreme Court of Virginia had not addressed
whether officers of a corporation that allegedly violated section
8.01-40 might be personally liable for "using' a plaintiffs name.'65
In responding to the defendants' citation to New York's privacy
statute (because the Supreme Court of Virginia cited to it in the
past as instructive), the circuit court observed that even under
New York's interpretation of the term "use," the defendants, as
159. Id.
160. Id.
16L Id.
162. 50 Va. Cir. 327 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Virginia Beach City).
163. Id. at 329.
164. Id. at 327.
165. Id. at 328.
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corporate officers, could be personally liable for "using" the plain-
tiffs name.166 Furthermore, the court distinguished a cited New
York case by noting that the plaintiff in the case before the court
alleged that both of the defendants exercised control over the
placement of the plaintiffs name in the advertisement and, as
owners, they derived a direct benefit from the continued use of
the plaintiffs name.
16 7
In rejecting the defendants' second argument, the circuit court
observed that the express terms of section 8.01-40 "provide that
an injured plaintiff may maintain a suit in equity against 'the
person, firm or corporation so using such person's name.""6 Thus,
the court concluded that the broad language used in the statute
did not indicate that the General Assembly desired to alter as a
tenet of corporate law the common law rule that corporate officers
may be liable for their tortious conduct.'69 Rather, the General
Assembly's inclusive use of the terms "corporation, firm or per-
son" indicated a clear desire to continue holding corporate officers
liable for their tortious conduct.
7 0
B. Commercial Law
1. Assignment of Promissory Note-Lack of Consent
In Apartment Investment and Management Co. v. National
Loan Investors, L.P., 7' the Supreme Court of Virginia determined
that the Richmond Circuit Court erred in awarding judgment
based on a promissory note that was assigned without the con-
sent of the maker in violation of an express requirement stated in
the note. 72
In acquiring apartment complexes, Winthrop Southeast, L.P.
("Winthrop") borrowed the purchase money from Investors Sav-
ings Bank, F.S.B. ("Investors") under a promissory note ("Note")
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 328 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Repl. Vol. 1992)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 328-29.
171. 258 Va. 322, 518 S.E.2d 627 (1999).
172. Id. at 329, 518 S.E.2d at 631.
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requiring Winthrop to repay the loan in installments.'73 The Note
defined the term "Noteholder" as including Investors' successors
and assigns, but it precluded any transfer or assignment "by
Noteholder without the prior written consent of [Winthrop]."" It
also contained a non-recourse provision limiting available reme-
dies in the event Winthrop defaulted. 5 Winthrop failed to make
any payments under the Note.'76
Ultimately, the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") was ap-
pointed receiver for Investors and provided written notice to Win-
throp that the loan was in default.'77 RTC subsequently assigned
its interest in the Note to RTC Commercial Loan Trust (the
"Trust").78 After filing an action in circuit court against Winthrop
for, among other things, judgment in the full amount due under
the Note, the Trust assigned its interest in the Note to National
Loan Investors, L.P. ("NLI").'79 The circuit court awarded judg-
ment under the Note to NLI.180
Winthrop appealed, alleging that the circuit court erroneously
based its judgment upon NLI's purported status as a holder of a
negotiable instrument-the Note.' 8 ' Since the evidence was
uncontested that Winthrop did not provide prior written consent
to the assignment from the Trust to NLI, Winthrop argued that
NLI failed to establish that it was a valid holder of the Note by
assignment.8 2
However, since the Note did not explicitly prohibit or invalidate
assignments made without the requisite consent, NLI argued
that, at most, the assignment from the Trust to NLI, without
Winthrop's prior consent, operated as a breach of the Note. 8 3 Ad-
ditionally, NLI argued that, under Hurley v. Bennett,' Winthrop
173. Id. at 325, 518 S.E.2d at 628.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 326-27, 518 S.E.2d at 628-29.
180. Id. at 327, 518 S.E.2d at 629.
18L Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 327, 518 S.E.2d at 629-30.
184. 163 Va. 241, 176 S.E. 171 (1934). The court stated that "the party who commits
the first breach of a contract, is not entitled to enforce it... against the other party for his
subsequent failure to perform."Id. at 253, 176 S.E.2d at 175.
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was precluded from attacking NLI as a purported "Noteholder"
because Winthrop breached the contract first by defaulting under
the Note." 5 Finally, NLI argued that federal law preempted the
Note's restriction on assignment. 186 Therefore, as a subsequent
transferee of a holder in due course, NLI contended that it was
entitled to the same statutory rights of the Trust to receive an as-
signment of the Note without the prior written consent of Win-
throp. 8
7
The Supreme Court of Virginia first concluded the evidence
was uncontested that both the Trust and NLI failed to obtain
written consent before acquiring the Note.' Moreover, NLI's
failure to obtain prior written consent was not merely a breach of
the terms under the Note; rather, it was a condition precedent to
any assignment of the Note.8 9 Therefore, since the condition was
not satisfied because neither the Trust nor NLI obtained the req-
uisite consent, the court held that the purported assignment to
NLI was invalid, and NLI was precluded thereby from pursuing
causes of action based upon the incorrect assertion that it was a
valid "Noteholder."190
Furthermore, since the unsatisfied precondition-obtaining
consent to assign-prevented formulation of a valid contract be-
tween NLI and Winthrop, Winthrop was not precluded under
Hurley by its initial breach of the Note from asserting as a de-
fense that NLI failed to establish itself as a "Noteholder" entitled
to sue under the Note.'9 ' The court observed that applying NLI's
rationale under the facts would, in effect, allow a stranger to the
Note, NLI, to enforce the Note against Winthrop, a party thereto,
simply because Winthrop had defaulted under the Note. 92
The supreme court also rejected NLI's preemption argument
because, as a non-recourse obligation, the Note lacked negotiabil-
ity because it did not constitute an unconditional promise to pay a
185. Nat'l Loan Investors, 258 Va. at 328, 518 S.E.2d at 630.
186. Id. at 329, 518 S.E.2d at 630. NLI cited 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II) as author-
izing the RTC to ". . . transfer any asset or liability of the institution in default... without
any approval, assignment, or consent with respect to such transfer." Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 328, 518 S.E.2d at 630.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 328-29, 518 S.E.2d at 630.
192. Id.
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fixed amount of money.193 Thus, RTC's assignment to the Trust,
although permitted under federal law, did not confer upon the
Trust the status of a holder in due course of a negotiable instru-
ment.194 Consequently, because the Note was nonnegotiable, the
court held that neither NLI, nor the Trust, was entitled to assert
any right that a holder in due course may have had under appli-
cable federal law.'95
2. Contract-Promissory Notes-Promise to Forebear
Hamm v. Scott'96 involved a case where a plaintiff loaned
$16,080 under a promissory note to a printing and graphics com-
pany operated by the two defendants, an attorney and her father-
in-law. 97 The defendant borrowers defaulted on the first note, but
the plaintiff agreed to forebear collection of the first note against
the father-in law and loaned the company an additional $16,000
under a second note. 93 The second note provided that the bor-
rower's complete payment in accordance with the terms of the
second note would extinguish all of the company's debts to the
plaintiff.'99 Moreover, the parties agreed that if the borrowers
failed to make payments as required under the second note, the
plaintiff was entitled to collect under both of the notes.0 °
The defendant defaulted under the terms of the second note,
and the plaintiff filed suit seeking to enforce both notes.2 ' Fol-
lowing a bench trial, the Hampton Circuit Court found that the
second note was provided as forbearance, and therefore, the
plaintiff was precluded from collecting his money a second time
under the second note.20 2 On the basis of the foregoing, the circuit
court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the first note
and denied judgment on the second note.20 3 The plaintiff noted an
193. Id. at 329, 518 S.E.2d at 630-31.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 329, 518 S.E.2d at 631.
196. 258 Va. 35, 515 S.E.2d 773 (1999).
197. Id. at 36, 515 S.E.2d at 773.
198. Id. at 37, 515 S.E.2d at 773.
199. Id.
200. Id.
20L Id. at 38, 515 S.E.2d at 774.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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appeal contesting the circuit court's refusal to enforce the second
note.2 04
The Supreme Court of Virginia cited prior Virginia authority
for the propositions that a promise to forebear the exercise of a
legal right establishes adequate consideration to support a con-
tract2 5 and an agreement to forebear does not require a writing,
but may be implied from the parties' conduct and the nature of
the transaction.2 °6 The court then noted that the circuit court, in
ruling for the borrowers, determined as a factual matter that the
parties, by their words and by their conduct, entered into an
agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed not to enforce the first
note against the father-in-law if the defendant attorney executed
a second note in the plaintiffs favor. 7 Therefore, because the
evidence fully supported the circuit court's ruling on forbearance,
the court rejected the defendant's arguments that no evidence es-
tablished a meeting of the minds between the parties as to a for-
bearance, and nothing surrounding the conduct of the parties im-
plied a forbearance.2 8
Additionally, the supreme court concluded that the second note
was an independent contractual obligation, valid on its face, un-
der which the plaintiff agreed to a forbearance only if he was en-
titled to enforce both notes in the event of a default under the
second note.20 9 Therefore, because the defendants defaulted under
the second note, and the plaintiffs obligation to forbear enforce-
ment terminated upon such default, the plaintiff was entitled to
enforce the second note according to its express terms.210
In responding to the plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim, the
court observed that by fulfilling his agreement not to collect the
debt due under the first note from the father-in-law, the plaintiff
agreed to forego an opportunity to invest approximately $20,000
due under the first note during the succeeding two years.2" Thus,
the plaintiffs enforcement of the second note pursuant to the un-
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing Greenwood Assoc., Inc. v. Crestar Bank, 248 Va. 265, 448 S.E.2d 399
(1994)).
206. Id. (citing Troyer v. Troyer, 231 Va. 90, 341 S.E.2d 182 (1986)).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 38, 515 S.E.2d at 775.
211. Id. at 38-39, 515 S.E.2d at 775.
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derstanding between the parties (i.e., if the defendant failed to
pay the second note as required, the plaintiff was entitled to col-
lect under both notes) did not unjustly enrich the plaintiff; rather,
the plaintiff was merely receiving the benefit of the bargain for
which he had contracted.212 Consequently, the supreme court re-
versed the circuit court's judgment denying the plaintiff a recov-
ery under the second note and remanded the case for computation
of the amount due under the second note and entry of a judgment
award in that amount for the plaintiff.213
3. Virginia Commercial Code-Finance Lease-Warranties
In One Stop Pet, Inc. v. Eastern Business Machines, Inc., 214 an
equipment supply company demurred to a pet store owner's suit
filed in the Fairfax County Circuit Court complaining about a
new cash register system purchased under a finance lease and in-
stalled by the equipment supplier.2 5 The store owner complained
that the supplier agreed to install a specified system capable of
performing certain designated functions.216 Instead, the supplier
installed another system from the same manufacturer that the
supplier promised would perform better.2" The store owner al-
leged the system did not meet the represented specifications and
the supplier failed to correct the deficiency.1 8
The supplier demurred, asserting the store owner was not enti-
tled to implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose under the finance lease with the manufac-
turer.219 The court determined that the store owner conceded in
an amended complaint that its causes of action were based upon a
"finance lease" with the manufacturer and that the supplier was
a "supplier" under the Virginia Commercial Code.22° Further, un-
der Virginia Commercial Code sections 8.2A-212 and 8.2A-213,
the circuit court concluded that implied warranties of merchant-
212. Id. at 39, 515 S.E.2d at 775.
213. Id.
214. 49 Va. Cir. 221 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax County).
215. Id. at 223.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 222.
220. Id.
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ability and fitness apply in lease contracts "except for a finance
lease."221 Consequently, because the store owner's counts based
upon implied statutory warranties were insufficient as a matter
of law to state a cause of action, the court granted the supplier's
demurrer and dismissed each of the store owner's implied statu-
tory warranty claims without leave to amend.222
The supplier also demurred on the ground that it acted under
the finance lease merely as a supplier of goods to the store owner
and not as a party to the contract.22 Thus, the supplier argued
that the lack of any contractual relationship with the store owner
(i.e., lack of privity of contract) precluded any claim under the
lease against the supplier for breach of express warranties or
negligent misrepresentation. 2' The court overruled the supplier's
argument after citing Virginia Commercial Code section 8.2-209
in support of the finding that the store owner "may have a cause
of action against the [supplier] for breach of express warranties
under the finance lease."2 5 Finally, the court found that the store
owner clearly alleged in the complaint "the relationship, knowl-
edge, express warranties, and provisions" to assert an express
warranty claim against the supplier.226
C. Contract Law
1. Consulting Agreement-Indemnity
The propriety of awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing
party in a warrant in debt suit was addressed in Coady v. Strate-
gic Resources, Inc.2 27 The defendant corporation retained the
plaintiff to perform consulting services under a written consulting
agreement.228 The agreement included a broad indemnity provi-
sion under which the plaintiff agreed to hold the defendant
harmless for all liabilities (including court costs and attorney's
fees) from "any and all claims, suits, proceedings, costs, losses,
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 223.
226. Id.
227. 258 Va. 12, 515 S.E.2d 273 (1999).
228. Id. at 14, 515 S.E.2d at 273-74.
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expenses, damages and liabilities ... caused by or arising out of,
or in connection with [the plaintiffs] performance or non-
performance under this Agreement."229
The plaintiff submitted an invoice for services rendered."0 The
defendant rejected the invoice and delivered a check for approxi-
mately one-half of the invoice, noting in a side letter that pay-
ment was a settlement of all accounts." The plaintiff accepted
the check and deposited it in his bank account marked as "partial
payment of account." 2 After the defendant refused the plaintiffs
second demand for payment of the alleged balance due on the de-
fendant's account, the plaintiff filed a warrant in debt in the Gen-
eral District Court of Fairfax CountyY3
The defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract and
breach of warranty.24 On the defendant's motion, the district
court dismissed the claims of both parties based on an accord and
satisfaction under Virginia Code section 8.3A-311.2 5 With leave of
the district court, the defendant then sought to recover attorney's
fees from the plaintiff pursuant to the indemnity provision. 6 The
district court awarded the defendant $3228 in attorney's fees.2'
On appeal, the Fairfax County Circuit Court awarded the defen-
dant the same amount for attorney's fees.2"
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the award of
attorney's fees. 9 The court first rejected the plaintiffs argument
229. Id. at 14, 515 S.E.2d at 274.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 14-15, 515 S.E.2d at 274.
233. Id. at 15, 515 S.E.2d at 274.
234. Id.
235. Id. In pertinent part, Virginia Code section 8.3A-311 provides that:
if a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (i) that person in
good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the
claim, (ii) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide
dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument... the
claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves
that the instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a
conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full
satisfaction of the claim.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3A-311(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
236. Coady, 258 Va. at 15, 515 S.E.2d at 274.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 19, 515 S.E.2d at 277.
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that, because neither party obtained a judgment award against
the other in the underlying proceeding, neither party was entitled
to an award of costs against the other.240 The court determined
that the outcome of an award of costs and fees was controlled not
by the statutes cited by the plaintiff or "Anglo-Saxon jurispru-
dence," but by the language of the indemnity provision agreed to
by the parties in the consulting agreement.24 '
Further, the supreme court rejected the plaintiffs contention
that the original warrant in debt related to the defendant's non-
performance in rendering payment rather than to a proceeding
connected to the plaintiffs performance under the agreement. 2
The court labeled the plaintiffs argument "pure sophistry," not-
ing that the plaintiff sought recovery for his performance under
the agreement, and the defendant's answer denied liability based
on the plaintiffs failure to perform.243 Therefore, since all of the
claims asserted by the plaintiff related to the plaintiff's perform-
ance or non-performance under the agreement, the court held
that the indemnification clause governed the award of attorney's
fees to the defendant.2
Finally, the supreme court rejected the plaintiffs claim that
the award of attorney's fees was excessive.245 Instead, the court
concluded that, based on the attorney's time sheets, expert testi-
mony, and lack of countervailing evidence submitted by the de-
fendant, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in making
the award of attorney's fees to the defendant.246
Two justices dissented by arguing that the indemnification
clause did not apply under the facts, and even assuming that the
clause did apply, it was clear from the record that the circuit
court abused its discretion in awarding an excessive fee. 7
240. Id. at 16, 515 S.E.2d at 275.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 17, 515 S.E.2d at 275-76.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 17-18, 515 S.E.2d at 276.
245. Id. at 18, 515 S.E.2d at 276.
246. Id. at 18-19, 515 S.E.2d at 276.
247. Id. at 19-20, 515 S.E.2d at 277 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
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2. Liquidated Damages-Credit Card Late Fees
In Perez v. Capital One Bank,' the Supreme Court of Virginia
responded to a question certified from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois by holding that Virginia
Code section 6.1-330.63 precluded a challenge, under the common
law doctrine of unlawful liquidated damages, to late fees arising
under contracts governed by Virginia law between credit card is-
suers and card holders.2 9
The plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, filed a class action suit in
federal court in Illinois against the defendant, a limited-purpose
credit card bank with its principal place of business located in
Virginia. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that late fees
charged by the defendant against her credit card account consti-
tuted unlawful liquidated damages under the common law of Vir-
ginia. The defendant's customer agreement provided that Vir-
ginia and federal law governed the agreement and that the
defendant was entitled to impose a late charge when a customer
failed to make a timely payment.2
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that section 6.1-330.63(A) did
not preclude her from challenging the defendant's fee as unlawful
liquidated damages because that section did not abrogate the
common law of contracts in Virginia. 3 The plaintiff argued fur-
ther that, absent language plainly manifesting intent to abrogate
the common law, the common law remains intact and operative.254
The defendant responded that the General Assembly explicitly
abrogated the common law by enacting Virginia Code section 6.1-
330.80, which specifically authorizes lenders to impose a five per-
cent late charge for failure to make timely payment of any in-
stallment due on a debt.255 Further, the defendant argued that, in
248. 258 Va. 612, 522 S.E.2d 874 (1999).
249. Id. at 617, 522 S.E.2d at 876.
250. Id. at 614, 522 S.E.2d at 875.
251 Id.
252. Id. at 615, 522 S.E.2d at 875.
253. Id. at 616, 522 S.E.2d at 876.
254. Id.
255. Id. Virginia Code section 6.1-330.80 provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any lender... may impose a late charge for failure to make timely payment
of any installment due on a debt. ... provided that such late charge does not
exceed five percent of the amount of such installment payment and that the
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enacting section 6.1-330.63, the General Assembly removed the
five percent limitation established in section 6.1-330.80, thereby
permitting parties to contract in a revolving credit agreement for
fees in excess of the limit.
2 5 6
The supreme court first concluded that section 6.1-330.80 spe-
cifically permitted a lender and a debtor to agree to a late charge
that did not exceed five percent of the amount of a past due in-
stallment.257 Thus, a lender could charge up to five-percent with-
out being required to show that the actual damages were uncer-
tain and difficult to determine and that the amount charged was
not out of proportion to the probable loss.
258
Further, the supreme court concluded that the General Assem-
bly, in enacting section 6.1-330.80, clearly intended to abrogate
the common law rule prohibiting a penalty.259 Moreover, in en-
acting section 6.1-330.63, the General Assembly removed the five
percent cap on charges imposed by banks and savings institutions
under contracts for revolving credit, thereby allowing charges "at
such rates and in such amounts ... as may be agreed by the bor-
rower."26° Thus, as section 6.1-330.63 contained more specific lan-
guage applicable to banks and revolving credit plans, the court
held that this section perpetuated the abrogation of the common
law rule, and therefore, the late fees charged by the defendant did
not constitute unlawful liquidated damages.2
3. Oral Contract-City Amphitheater-Ownership Interest
In Reid v. Boyle,262 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that al-
though the plaintiff employee had a written agreement with the
defendant and his entertainment company, the parties' oral con-
tract concerning the plaintiffs role in developing a new amphi-
theater project in Virginia Beach, plus the parties' course of
charge is specified in the contract between the lender... and the debtor.
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.80 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
256. Perez, 258 Va. at 616, 522 S.E.2d at 876.
257. Id. at 617, 522 S.E.2d at 876.
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.63 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
261. Id.
262. 259 Va. 356, 527 S.E.2d 137 (2000).
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dealing, modified that agreement.263 The court determined that
the plaintiff established sufficient evidence in the Virginia Beach
Circuit Court to prove that the plaintiff held a one-third interest
in the defendants' leasehold interest in the amphitheater (worth
approximately $3,566,343) under the parties' modified agree-
ment.
26
The plaintiff began working for the defendant and his business
in 1981 as a talent agent, booking entertainment for college cam-
puses. 5 The plaintiff gradually took on more responsibility and
ultimately asserted that under a contract with the defendant, the
plaintiff held a one-third-ownership interest in an amphitheater
built by the defendant's company and the City of Virginia
Beach.266
On appeal, the supreme court determined that the plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to permit the chancellor to ascertain
from the language the parties used, with reasonable certainty
and in light of all the surrounding circumstances, that the plain-
tiff entered into an oral contract with the defendant and his com-
pany.267 The court further found that pursuant to the terms of
this contract, the defendants promised to give the plaintiff a one-
third interest in the value of the company's leasehold interest in
the amphitheater.268
Further, the supreme court found the record supported the
chancellor's findings because the defendant asserted absolute
control over his company, which owned the leasehold interest, but
he admitted conducting the corporation's financial affairs with an
"air of informality."269 Moreover, the defendant promised the
plaintiff that he would own one-third of the amphitheater project
if the plaintiff "could bring his concept of an amphitheater in Vir-
ginia Beach to fruition."7 0 The defendant also repeatedly assured
the plaintiff that the plaintiff owned a one-third interest in the
263. Id. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 145.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 361, 527 S.E.2d at 140.
266. Id. at 362-66, 527 S.E.2d at 140-43.
267. Id. at 367, 527 S.E.2d at 144.
268. Id. at 368, 527 S.E.2d at 144.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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amphitheater project.2 1' Finally, the defendant told a friend of
thirty-five years, who testified for the plaintiff, that the plaintiff
owned an interest in the amphitheater project.22
The supreme court also found that the plaintiff partially per-
formed under an oral contract. The court determined that the
plaintiff permitted approximately $88,000 of compensation that
he ultimately received from another of the defendant's companies
to fund the initial operating costs incurred by defendant's com-
pany in developing the project. 4 Moreover, the plaintiff "signed a
letter of credit and a [personal] guaranty which the City required
before it would proceed with the construction of the amphithea-
ter."275 Finally, the defendants "admitted in their response to a
request for admission that [plaintiffs] acts of signing the personal
guaranty and letter of credit were 'above and beyond' his job re-
sponsibilities as president of [defendant company]" that employed
the plaintiff.2 6
Additionally, the supreme court determined that the chancellor
was entitled to consider the defendant's history of giving employ-
ees, including the plaintiff, ownership interests in corporations
that the defendant controlled and the fact that defendant com-
pany's primary asset was its leasehold interest with the city.7
The chancellor also considered the defendant's statement to the
plaintiff that the defendant "had an agreement that would confer
an ownership interest to [the plaintiff] in the amphitheater proj-
ect, but that ... [he had returned] it to the lawyers for simplifica-
tion. ,278
Finally, the supreme court held that the parties' oral contract,
combined with their course of dealing, modified the earlier writ-
ten agreement because the plaintiff established by clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing evidence that the defendant, acting on
behalf of himself and his company, promised the plaintiff that he
would have a one-third interest in the amphitheater leasehold in
return for the plaintiffs efforts in the project. 79
271. Id.
272. Id. at 365, 527 S.E.2d at 142.
273. Id. at 368, 527 S.E.2d at 144.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 369-70, 527 S.E.2d at 144-45.
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4. Settlement Agreement-Enforceability
In Power Services, Inc. v. MCI Constructors, Inc., ° the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia enforced
a settlement agreement between two parties, despite the plain-
tiffs claim of revocation prior to defendant's acceptance.28' The
defendant, a general contractor, hired the plaintiff "to construct a
Boiler/Chiller Plant at Reagan National Airport."282 A dispute
arose over amounts claimed by the plaintiff for extra work,
changed orders and delayed costs. 2' After the defendant refused
payment of the disputed amounts, the plaintiff proposed a coun-
teroffer to settle the dispute for $60,000.28 The parties agreed to
settle the dispute. 5 The plaintiffs attorney signed a "Settlement
Memorandum" on behalf of his client, and defendant's attorney
faxed a signed copy to his client.286 However, the plaintiff at-
tempted to withdraw the counteroffer the next day.28 7
The district court held that a settlement agreement was
reached before the parties signed the settlement memorandum.8 8
Therefore, the memorandum was simply evidence of the prior oral
agreement and not the actual agreement.2 9 The court also found
that each party manifested intent to compromise the dispute and
acted in an affirmative manner in entering into settlement.29 ° In
particular, the court noted that the parties exchanged multiple
drafts of the agreement and that the defendant's attorney ver-
bally communicated the terms of the agreement to his client.291
Under Virginia law, a compromise and settlement of a suit or dis-
puted claim binds parties unless such settlement or compromise
resulted from fraud, mistake, or undue advantage; therefore, the
district court upheld the settlement entered between the par-
ties.
292
280. No. CIV.A97-927-A, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5311 (E.D. Va. Mar. 7,2000).
28L See id. at *9.
282. Id. at *1.
283. Id. at *2.
284. Id. at *3.
285. Id.
286. Id. at *3-4.
287. Id. at *4.
288. Id. at *5-6.
289. See id.
290. Id. at *7.
291. Id.
292. Id. at *9.
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5. Open Account-Nonconforming Goods
In Micro Products, Inc. v. Sylvan Learning Systems, Inc.,293 the
Fairfax County Circuit Court affirmed the right of a buyer to re-
voke acceptance of nonconforming goods, even after an extensive
delay.294 Micro Products ("Micro") filed suit seeking full payment
in connection with videoconferencing software purchased by code-
fendants, Sylvan Learning Systems ("Sylvan") and Caliber
Learning Network, Inc.295 Sylvan counterclaimed for breach of
contract and breach of warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose. 29
6
The circuit court found that Sylvan properly revoked accep-
tance by letter, despite a five-month delay from the date of deliv-
ery to the date of revocation.297 Citing Virginia Code section 8.2-
608, the court also found that revocation was made within a
"commercially reasonable time," since any delay allowed Micro
time to cure the system's deficiencies.298 When it became clear
that Micro would make no further repair efforts, Sylvan promptly
gave notice of revocation.299 Since the delay and use caused no
substantial impairment to the value of the goods, Sylvan's revoca-
tion was deemed proper.300
Finally, the circuit court limited damages to a refimd of the
money Sylvan paid to Micro for the goods purchased.0 i The court
reasoned that under Virginia Code section 8.2-714(2), Sylvan was
not allowed damages based on the difference between the value of
the goods accepted and as warranted because of insufficient evi-
dence in the record for calculating accurate damages.0 2 The court
also denied Sylvan the cost of cover because the system it subse-
quently purchased did not represent a reasonable substitute, but
an upgrade.3
293. 49 Va. Cir. 24 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax County).
294. Id. at 27.
295. Id. at 24.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 27.
29. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 26-27.
301. Id. at 29-30.
302. Id. at 29.
303. Id.
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6. Settlement Agreement-Patent Ambiguity
Mehlman v. American Property Services, Inc. 4 serves as a ve-
hicle for clarifying the distinction between patent and latent am-
biguities within a contract. The Fairfax County Circuit Court
concluded that a nondescript provision in a settlement agreement
reciting merely "balance due" qualified as a patent ambiguity ob-
vious on the face of a contract.0 5
The plaintiffs filed suit to enforce a settlement agreement en-
tered with the defendants that provided a provisional payment
schedule for settling a series of disputes relating to investments
made by the plaintiffs with the defendants.0 6 The agreement
identified specific amounts due, methods for calculating such
amounts, and the dates of payment for the first six scheduled
payments. °7 However, the seventh and final payment indicated
merely a "lblalance due.., on 4/30/98," providing neither a spe-
cific amount nor a method of calculation.3°" The defendants ar-
gued that the court was precluded from allowing the plaintiffs to
admit parol evidence to explain the patently ambiguous terms of
the final payment due under the agreement.0 9
The circuit court cited the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding
in Galloway Corp. v. S.B. Ballard Construction Co."1° that defined
a patent ambiguity as an ambiguity that is "self-evident from the
writing itself."3 ' The supreme court also determined that the con-
fusion arising in the settlement agreement was not latent, be-
cause the "balance due" was not subject to two meanings within
the four corners of the agreement, but had one meaning, upon
which the parties simply failed to agree.3' Thus, the court re-
jected the plaintiffs' request to admit parol evidence in deter-
mining that the "balance due" for the final scheduled payment
304. 49 Va. Cir. 74 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax County).
305. Id. at 79.
306. Id. at 74-75.
307. Id. at 76-77.
308. Id. at 77.
309. Id. at 75.
310. 250 Va. 493, 464 S.E.2d 349 (1995).
311. MehIman, 49 Va. Cir. at 78. The court also observed that a latent ambiguity is not
obvious to the parties and allows for the admission of parol evidence in determining the
intent of the parties. Id. at 79.
312. Id. at 79.
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under the agreement amounted to $400,000.113
The circuit court also found the plaintiffs' demand for such a
significant sum troubling in view of the balance "cursorily re-
ferred to" by the parties in the settlement agreement.1 4 Conse-
quently, the court refused to enforce the final payment term
against the defendants, leaving the plaintiffs to renew litigation
against a third-party debtor.315
7. Employment-Noncompete Agreement-Roofing Contractor
In Cliff Simons Roofing, Inc. v. Cash,16 the Rockingham
County Circuit Court sustained a defendant's demurrer and held
that a roofing contractor was precluded from enforcing a one-year
noncompete agreement against a former employee because the
agreement contained no geographic restriction.317 After nine years
of employment with the plaintiff, the defendant signed the
agreement at the plaintiffs request just months before the defen-
dant tendered his resignation.1 8
In his demurrer, the defendant alleged that the agreement
prevented him from being employed by any company throughout
the United States that conducted any business substantially
similar to the plaintiffs business.319 The defendant alleged fur-
ther that the prohibition extended beyond the bounds of reason,
particularly in light of the fact that the market area in which the
defendant actually competed was limited to Virginia, specifically
Harrisonburg, Rockingham County, and Augusta County.32 °
The circuit court concluded that the noncompete agreement
was clearly unenforceable because it established absolutely no
geographic boundaries and it also prevented the defendant from
going to work for any roofing company in the United States.32'
Moreover, the agreement prevented the defendant from working
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See id. at 80.
316. 49 Va. Cir. 156 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Rockingham County).
317. Id. at 158.
318. Id. at 156.
319. Id. at 157.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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for a roofing company located in the plaintiffs admitted market
area even if the defendant obtained employment where he could
not utilize confidential information or where he played no com-
peting role against his former employer, such as a job as a janitor
or a stock clerk for a local roofing company.
322
Finally, the court specifically declined the plaintiffs request to
edit by selective enforcement (i.e., apply the "blue pencil" to the
restrictions) what would otherwise be an invalid restriction on
competition. 23
8. Reward-Alzheimer's Patient
Craig v. Scott 24 addressed the nature of liability under an offer
of reward for a missing Alzheimer's patient.125 The plaintiff
sought to recover a reward upon finding the remains of a missing
patient while hunting.3 26 The Brunswick County Circuit Court
considered two issues: (1) the nature of the offer of reward; and
(2) the presence of any consideration upon which to establish a
contract.327
Since the offer was characterized as "vague and general, with-
out specific terms or conditions," the court looked to the offeror's
intent to find that the most reasonable interpretation of the re-
ward was for the safe return of the patient or information leading
thereto. 8 Furthermore, in determining the issue of considera-
tion, the circuit court held that the consideration necessary to
support a promise was not the benefit to the promisor, but the
trouble or inconvenience to the promisee in relying upon the
promise.9 Under the facts, the circuit court found no considera-
tion because the plaintiff discovered the remains accidentally
while hunting and not while actively searching for the missing
person.33°
322. Id.
323. Id. at 158.
324. 49 Va. Cir. 263 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Brunswick County).
325. Id. at 263.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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9. Contract Termination--Jury Question-Good Faith Duty
The Fairfax County Circuit Court considered the rights and
limits of "implied conditions" in Vega Investments Corp. v. Rocky
Gorge Enterprises, L.L.C.331 On reconsideration of a prior ruling,
the circuit court upheld jury instructions that created an implied
contractual condition requiring termination of a contract to be ex-
ercised within a "reasonable time." "'
The dispute centered around a forty-five day "study" period
provided to the defendant after which the defendant was required
to decide whether to consummate the purchase of a parcel of
land. 3' At the end of the period, the defendant held an option ei-
ther to submit a cash deposit or to terminate the contract.334 The
court identified the controlling issue as the length of time the de-
fendant had under the contract to render a decision following the
end of the period.3  The defendant appealed based upon a jury
instruction that created an implied condition in the contract by
asking the jury to determine whether the defendant provided no-
tice of termination of the contract within a "reasonable period of
time."336
The defendant argued that the contract was patently ambigu-
ous, and therefore the admission of parol evidence was barred.3 7
In rejecting this contention, the circuit court determined that
while the contract was patently ambiguous, the jury did not have
an opportunity to review parol evidence as an aid in its determi-
nation of the reasonableness of the defendant's delay.338
The court concluded that the intent of the parties established
support for its holding that the nature of the contract (a sale of a
specific parcel of land) implied a definite period for perform-
ance.33 9 Though the contract did not include a "time is of the es-
sence" clause, the court found that the plaintiffs actions, par-
ticularly in designating a specific time period for study and then
331. 49 Va. Cir. 343 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax County).
332. Id. at 343-44.
333. Id. at 343.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 344.
339. Id. at 345.
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refusing to extend that time, indicated that time was indeed of
the essence. 4 °
The circuit court also cited to section 204 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts as establishing authority for implying con-
tractual conditions."' Finally, the court also addressed policy
concerns relating to fairness in determining that the defendant
violated a duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to the plaintiff
when he attempted to exercise the right of termination at a com-
mercially unreasonable time.42
10. Employment-Fraudulent Inducement
In Hiers v. Cave Hill Corp.,3  the Rockingham County Circuit
Court held that a man who claimed his fixed-term employment
contract was breached may sue for breach of contract, but not for
"fraudulent inducement" based on misrepresentations that were
covered by the allegations of breach of contract, nor for civil con-
spiracy or tortious interference with contract.3
In sustaining the defendants' demurrer to fraudulent induce-
ment counts, the circuit court first observed that the Supreme
Court of Virginia has clearly stated that a claim for fraudulent
inducement does not lie where a mere breach of contract occurs.345
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged certain "misrepresentations," in-
cluding the defendants' statements that (1) the plaintiff would
remain employed until 2003, (2) the employer would allow the
plaintiff to approve and process all sales negotiations and con-
tracts, (3) the company's general manager would be supervised by
the plaintiff, and (4) the general manager would have all his sales
negotiations and contracts approved and processed by the plain-
tiff.34 However, because each of the foregoing "misrepresenta-
tions" was a material element in the employment contract, the
circuit court ruled that the plaintiff failed to allege any "misrep-
340. Id.
34L See id.
342. See id. at 346.
343. No. CL99-117788, 2000 WL 145359 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 6, 2000) (Rockingham
County).
344. Id. at*5.
345. Id. at *2.
346. Id.
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resentation" or "fraudulent inducement" lying outside duties al-
ready owed by the plaintiff under the contract.347
Next, the circuit court determined that the plaintiff "failed to
timely void what he claim[ed was] a 'void' contract. . . .,,34 How-
ever, under Virginia law, a contract formed due to fraudulent in-
ducement is "voidable" and not void ab initio.3 9 Therefore, since
the plaintiff did not timely disaffirm the "voidable" contract, the
circuit court found that he accepted it and relied upon it, until the
employer ultimately terminated his employment.350 Therefore, the
plaintiff was bound under its terms.3 '
Finally, after reciting the well-settled rule that a person cannot
interfere with a contract to which he is a party, the circuit court
also sustained the defendants' demurrer to counts for tortious in-
terference with contract because the defendants were agents of
the contracting company. 52
11. Arbitration--Stockholder Agreement
In Cohen v. Willies Inc.,353 the Richmond Circuit Court dis-
missed the plaintiffs complaint after concluding that a clause in a
stockholders' agreement required arbitration of the plaintiff cor-
poration's claim against the defendant stockholder. 4 The clause
provided that "[a]ny dispute between parties relating to this
Agreement shall be submitted to and determined by a panel of
three arbitrators. .. .""' In Cohen, the defendant had failed to
make a payment under a demand note for $65,000 executed in
connection with the agreement.356 The defendant sought to dis-
miss the complaint by alleging that the plaintiff had a contractual
duty under the terms of the agreement to enter arbitration for the
resolution of the payment dispute under the noteY.3 7 The plaintiff
347. Id. at *3.
348. Id.
349. Id. at *2.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at *4.
353. No. LE-1462-1, 1999 WL 1318836 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 1999) (Richmond City).
354. Id. at *2.
355. Id. at *1.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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responded that collection of the note was beyond the scope of the
arbitration clause in the agreement."8
In rejecting the plaintiffs argument, the circuit court first de-
termined that the note obligated the defendant to make monthly
installment payments "without deductions or offset, except as
otherwise may be provided" in the shareholders' agreement.3 5 9
Next, the court concluded that the shareholders' agreement
clearly stated that any dispute relating to the agreement must be
resolved by arbitration.36 ° Thus, since the defendant argued that
the agreement specifically provided for setoffs due to the circum-
stances by which the plaintiff terminated the defendant's em-
ployment with the corporation, the terms of the agreement were
necessarily implicated in resolving the dispute. Furthermore,
since the note was entered between the corporation and a share-
holder and any allowed setoffs were expressly controlled by the
shareholders' agreement itself, the court held that the dispute
under the note clearly related to the agreement. 6' Therefore, be-
cause the arbitration clause controlled, the court dismissed the
plaintiffs suit on the note. 62
12. Fraud-Beanie Babies Investment
A quite speculative venture based upon joint investment in
Beanie Babies landed in the Spotsylvania County Circuit Court.
In Ingalls v. Lance,63 the plaintiff sued the defendant on theories
of merchandise not delivered, breach of contract and fraud relat-
ing to the purchase of $10,000 worth of Beanie Babies as part of
an investment scheme hatched between two friends.3
Despite conflicting and rather unusual testimony concerning
the nature of the business plan and the expectations of the par-
ties,365 the court rejected the plaintiffs claim for "merchandise not
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
36L See id. at *1-2.
362. See id. at *2.
363. No. CL98-489, 1999 WL 1095354 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 1999) (Spotsylvania
County).
364. Id. at *2.
365. The plaintiff argued that the defendant failed to follow through on their original
plan to market the Beanie Babies at craft shows. Id. at *1. The defendant responded that
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delivered."3 66 Although the value of the "Babies" may have been
below $5,000 (the plaintiffs actual share of the purchase price),
the plaintiff failed to establish evidence that the defendant failed
to deliver one-half of the merchandise purchased by the defen-
dant as part of their joint investment.167
Additionally, the circuit court concluded that the absence of an
express contract refuted the plaintiffs breach of contract claim
and that the plaintiff failed to prove fraud by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 6 The court also concluded that given the relation-
ship of the parties and the context in which such conversations
took place between the parties, the defendant's statements, if ac-
tually made, about the quality or value of the merchandise could
not be construed as promises, warranties, or representations. 69
The circuit court aptly described the relationship as the mere
joint venture between two friends, each of whom lacked expertise
in the subject matter, and both of whom concocted and entered
into a "vague and imprecise arrangement" resulting in a frustra-
tion of expectations 7 ° Finally, the court concluded that abso-
lutely no liability was implicated under any legally cognizable
theory 3 71
D. Partnership Law
1. Accounting-Damages-Dental Practice
Clark v. Scott372 presented an appeal of a decree from the
Fairfax County Circuit Court providing an accounting in the dis-
solution of partnership entered under an agreement between a
dentist and an oral surgeon for operating a dentistry and oral
she suffered a debilitating illness that left her unable to attend such shows. Id. The plain-
tiff also presented testimony of a Beanie Babies distributor who claimed most of the 117
Beanie Babies purchased by the plaintiff were valued under eight dollars. See id. The
court termed this testimony "vague and unreliable." Id.
366. Id. at *2.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. 258 Va. 296, 520 S.E.2d 366 (1999).
CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
surgery practice.3  Specifically, the Supreme Court of Virginia
was asked to determine whether the evidence supported the
chancellor's award of damages in an amount less than the rec-
ommendation made by a commissioner in chancery.374
After approximately eight months of operation, the surgeon
filed a complaint seeking dissolution of the partnership and pay-
ment from the dentist of sums allegedly due under the partner-
ship agreement. 75 The chancellor referred the matter to a com-
missioner in chancery, who, after conducting an ore tenus
hearing, concluded that the evidence supported the plaintiffs
version of the events and recommended a judgment award of
$74,507.376 The chancellor rejected the commissioner's findings as
not fully supported by the evidence and entered a final judgment
of $18,263. 377
In connection with the chancellor's holding rejecting the com-
missioner's finding that the defendant breached the partnership
agreement by denying the plaintiff access to the office, the su-
preme court concluded that the evidence reasonably supported
the conclusions made by either the commissioner or the chancel-
lor. The court stated that "since resolution of this factual dis-
pute rests strongly on the credibility of the witnesses, we must
defer to the commissioner's ability to evaluate the testimony and
evidence given in his presence."379 The supreme court reversed
the chancellor's finding overruling the commissioner's determina-
tion that the defendant unilaterally breached the partnership
agreement by denying the plaintiff access to the partnership's
rented office after the defendant changed the locks. 3 80 Moreover,
the court reinstated the judgment awarded by the commissioner
to the plaintiff based upon the defendant's breach of the partner-
ship agreement. 8 '
Furthermore, the supreme court determined that the commis-
sioner's recommendation that the defendant reimburse the plain-
373. Id. at 298-99, 520 S.E.2d at 367.
374. Id. at 298, 520 S.E.2d at 367.
375. Id. at 299, 520 S.E.2d at 368.
376. Id. at 299-301, 520 S.E.2d at 368-69.
377. Id. at 302, 520 S.E.2d at 369.
378. Id. at 302-03, 520 S.E.2d at 370.
379. Id. at 303, 520 S.E.2d at 370.
380. Id.
38L Id.
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tiff for payments of partnership expenses that the plaintiff made
while excluded from the office was based upon the finding that
the defendant denied the plaintiffs use of the partnership's of-
fice.382 Moreover, since the defendant did not contest the commis-
sioner's finding that the plaintiff paid these amounts for partner-
ship expenses related to the conduct of the partnership's
business, the court also reversed the chancellor's determination
denying the plaintiff reimbursement for such partnership ex-
penses.383
However, even accepting the foregoing determinations, the su-
preme court concluded that the plaintiff failed as a matter of law
to prove the "lost profit" portion of his damage claim.3"4 The court
noted that the evidence was undisputed that the partnership's
dental practice operated for only eight months when the defen-
dant breached the partnership agreement, and the partnership's
business was "very light" in the early months of the practice and
did not become "busy" until the last two months just before the
defendant's breach.38 5 Moreover, the record "fail[ed] to disclose
evidence reasonably supporting a conclusion that the partner-
ship's dental practice achieved the status of an established busi-
ness" prior to the defendant's breach. 88 Consequently, "since
the... practice was a new enterprise lacking an established
earning capacity," the court held that "the evidence [did] not
permit a reasonably certain estimate that [the plaintiffs] earn-
ings [during the two months just before the breach] were a rea-
sonable indicator of the amount he would have earned [in the
three month period after the breach occurred]."387
Furthermore, the plaintiffs testimony regarding his earnings
from a subsequent partnership with a new partner also failed to
establish a reasonable basis for an "intelligent and probable esti-
mate of the profits he would have earned" if the partnership with
the defendant continued during the lockout period.388 Therefore,
because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sup-
port the commissioner's recommendation for an award of lost
382. Id.
383. Id. at 304, 520 S.E.2d at 370.
384. Id. at 304, 520 S.E.2d at 371.
385. Id. at 304, 520 S.E.2d at 370.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
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profits to the plaintiff, the supreme court affirmed the chancel-
lor's judgment rejecting the lost profit award recommended by the
commissioner.3 89
2. Authority of General Partners-Dispute Resolution-
Refinancing
In Donnelly v. Donatelli & KMein, Inc.,39° the Supreme Court of
Virginia interpreted a partnership agreement for a limited part-
nership that included a real estate appraisers' firm ("Donnelly")
and the company that provided financial backing for an office and
warehouse complex ("Donatelli") in Fairfax County. 9' The court
held that the Fairfax County Circuit Court did not err in con-
cluding that Donatelli was authorized under the agreement's "tie-
breaker provision" to refinance the partnership property. 92
The appeal involved a limited partnership formed to own and
deal with a thirty-four acre tract of land containing office and
warehouse facilities for lease in Fairfax County.393 The affairs of
the partnership were governed by a limited partnership agree-
ment that authorized the general partners to act in relation to the
partnership property, in favor of third parties, and provided that
all decisions in managing the business affairs and assets of the
partnership were governed by unanimous vote of the general
partners.9 4 The agreement also established a tie-breaker provi-
sion, included at the insistence of Donatelli, the financial backer,
mandating that the general partner providing the financial
backing was authorized to determine, in its sole discretion, any
matter in dispute between the general partners that continued
after consultation between the general partners.395
After ten years, the plaintiffs, the real estate appraisers, and
the appraisers' firm filed a bill of complaint asserting derivative
claims on behalf of the partnership, including breach of contract,
389. Id. at 304, 520 S.E.2d at 370-7L
390. 258 Va. 171, 519 S.E.2d 133 (1999).
391. Id. at 174-75, 519 S.E.2d at 134-35.
392. Id. at 186, 519 S.E.2d at 142.
393. Id. at 174, 519 S.E.2d at 134.
394. Id. at 174-75, 519 S.E.2d at 135.
395. Id. at 175-76, 519 S.E.2d at 135.
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breach of fiduciary duty, tortious conversion, and conspiracy .3 96
While the bill was pending, the defendant, the financial backer,
sought the approval of the real estate appraisers' company to re-
finance the partnership property with a new lender in conjunc-
tion with a proposal to contribute that property and other com-
mercial properties to the formation of an umbrella property real
estate investment trust ("IJPREIT"), in return for the issuance of
units of limited partnership interest.39 Although one of the ap-
praisers objected to the proposal, the defendant proceeded to
complete initial phases in conveying the property to the
UPREIT. 8 In response, the plaintiffs filed several amended bills
of complaint and also sought a preliminary injunction restraining
the defendant from any further efforts to convey the property to
the UPREIT.399 In the second amended bill of complaint, the
plaintiffs contended that the attempted conveyance to the
UPREIT was without authority, and therefore, it should be re-
scinded."'
The chancellor denied the injunction, but in a stipulation and
order approved by the chancellor, the defendant agreed to "exer-
cise no authority as general partner [of the limited partner-
ship] ... without the express approval of the plaintiffs and that
the status quo would be maintained pending trial."4 '
In connection with the plaintiffs' rescission claim, the chancel-
lor found that the language of Sections 9 and 10 of the partner-
ship agreement was unambiguous and must be construed ac-
cording to the "plain meaning" rule." 2 The chancellor then
proceeded to hold as a matter of law that: (1) the conveyance of
the property by the defendant was authorized under the agree-
ment and, therefore, was valid; (2) the cross-collateralization of a
loan in connection with the conveyance was valid and enforceable;
and (3) the related deed of trust, assignment and pledge agree-
ment were authorized under the agreement and enforceable.40 3
Furthermore, the chancellor held in favor of the defendant on the
396. Id. at 176, 519 S.E.2d at 135-36.
397. Id. at 176, 519 S.E.2d at 136.
398. Id. at 177, 519 S.E.2d at 136.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 178, 519 S.E.2d at 137.
403. Id.
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counts of the second amended bill of complaint involving conspir-
acy and on the counts involving rescission, removal of the defen-
dant as a general partner, and appointment of a receiver. °4
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing in essence that the defendant
lacked authority under the agreement to effect the conveyance
and, therefore, the chancellor should have awarded judgment in
the plaintiffs' favor and rescinded the conveyance.0 5
In reviewing the rescission claim, the supreme court concluded
that Section 10, by its express terms, "encompass[ed] decisions
related not only to the management of the business but also to
management of the 'affairs and assets of the Partnership'.... "406
Moreover, the court determined that "the authority granted Do-
natelli... to make a decision in its sole discretion after consulta-
tion with Donnelly... extend[ed] to 'any disagreement... as to
any matter."'4 7 Finding that "[t]he parties could not have made
their intention more explicit," the court affirmed the chancellor's
conclusion that the agreement conferred power upon Donatelli to
determine, in its sole discretion and after consultation with Don-
nelly, the dispute concerning the refinancing of the partnership
and the subsequent conveyance of the partnership assets to the
new entity.40 8
Furthermore, the supreme court observed that any doubt or
uncertainty about the extent of the power granted to Donatelli by
Section 10(A) was negated by the interpretation placed on that
section by the parties themselves.4 9 The court also concluded that
the plaintiff failed to cite any legal principle that the chancellor
allegedly violated in according great weight to the interpretation
which one of the plaintiffs placed upon Section 10(A) in letters
sent to the defendant regarding the resolution of other dis-
putes.410
Consequently, the supreme court affirmed the chancellor's
404. Id.
405. Id. at 179, 519 S.E.2d at 137-38.
406. Id. at 180, 519 S.E.2d at 138.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 186, 519 S.E.2d at 142 (citing Dart Drug Corp. v. Nicholakos, 221 Va. 989,
277 S.E.2d 155 (1981) (reasoning that, under Virginia law, the interpretation of the par-
ties to an agreement is entitled to great weight and will be followed if that may be done
without violating applicable legal principles)).
410. Id.
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finding that the agreement granted the defendant the authority
to make the challenged conveyance of the limited partnership's
property, and upheld the judgment award in favor of the defen-
dant.41
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the rapid changes in business entities and electronic
commerce that have taken place in recent years, most of the dis-
putes reaching Virginia courts remain focused on traditional is-
sues of contract formation and interpretation and fiduciary du-
ties. The actions of the Virginia General Assembly in constantly
refining business entity legislation and in adopting progressive
uniform legislation, particularly in the field of electronic com-
merce, may help minimize the risk that legal disputes focused on
the nature of new business entities or electronic commerce will
have to be resolved in the courts.
411. Id.
